Translator's Introduction xxiii. O. Preliminary Note: The Scope of the. Critique of Judgment xxiii. 1. Kant's Life and Works xxvii. 2. The Critique of Pure Reason xxx. Free kindle book and epub digitized and proofread by Project Gutenberg. This version of the Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant is licensed under a Although the Critique of Judgment advances a very sophisticated aesthetic.
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Immanuel Kant, Kant's Critique of Judgement, translated with Introduction and Facsimile PDF, MB, This is a facsimile or image-based PDF made from. Book digitized by Google from the library of the University of Michigan and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb. Originally published in. The Critique of Practical Reason xxxix. 4. The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment: Background xlvii. S. Kant's Account of Judgments of Taste as Aesthetic Judgments.
Lofty oaks and lonely shadows in sacred groves are sublime, flower beds, low hedges, and trees trimmed into figures are beautiful. The night is sublime, the day is beautiful. Casts of mind that possess a feeling for the sublime are gradually drawn into lofty sentiments, of friendship, of contempt for the world, of eternity, by the quiet calm of a summer evening, when the flickering light of the stars breaks through the umber shadows of the night and the lonely moon rises into view.
The brilliant day inspires busy fervor and a feeling of gaiety. The sublime touches, the beautiful charms. Observations The view that aesthetics has fundamentally to do with pleasure was the predominate view in the 18th century, even though such a view may be less widespread nowadays. Kant invokes some of the argument styles that he had pursued in his first two Critiques in order to formulate the issue of aesthetic justification in new ways.
Specifically, Kant focuses on the logical form of aesthetic judgments a task he takes up primarily in the Analytic of the Beautiful , and then offers a deduction of judgments with just such a form. A key feature of these judgments, he thinks, is that they manifest universality and necessity. In finding something beautiful, he holds, we feel so strongly in favor of the object that we imply that everyone else will and ought to be pleased by it.
Unsurprisingly, commentators are of varying opinions as to whether the argument succeeds. In addition to taking on the task of attempting to establish that aesthetic judgments are justified, which runs throughout the Critique of Judgment, Kant also makes substantial contributions to thinking on the nature of the experience of sublimity, as well as the process of artistic creation.
On the latter point, he presents an account of artistic creativity or genius that has turned out to be very influential in the way in which we have come to think of the work of artists. Here, for instance, is his well-known definition of artistic genius: [G]enius 1 is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given: and not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule; and that consequently originality must be its primary property.
Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as would enable them to produce similar products. Hence, presumably, our word Genie is derived from genius, as the peculiar guardian and guiding spirit bestowed upon a human being at birth, by the inspiration of which those original ideas were obtained.
The Meredith translation has been widely used among English-speaking Kant scholars. The second part, not included here, is the Critique of Teleological judgment, which deals with judgments of design in nature. Standard methods of citing the text are by section number and page number e. CJ, 5: Critique of Judgement. Oxford University Press. A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing.
To enable me to judge a beauty of nature, as such, I do not need to be previously possessed of a concept of what sort of a thing the object is intended to be, i. I am not obliged to know its material purposiveness the end , but, rather, in judging it apart from any knowledge of the end, the mere form pleases on its own account.
If, however, the object is presented as a product of art, and is as such to be declared beautiful, then, seeing that art always presupposes an end in the cause and its causality , a concept of what the thing is intended to be must already be provided.
And, since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end constitutes the perfection of the thing, it follows that in judging beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account—a matter which in judging a beauty of nature, as beau- tiful, is quite irrelevant. Nature is no longer judged as it appears like art, but rather in so far as it actually is art, though superhuman art; and the teleological judgement serves as basis and condition of the aesthetic, and one Analytic of the Sublime which the latter must regard.
One kind of ugliness alone is incapable of being represented conformably to nature without destroying all aesthetic delight, and consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which excites disgust. The art of sculpture, again, since in its products art is almost confused with nature, has excluded from its creations the direct representation of ugly objects, and, instead, only sanctions, for example, the represen- tation of death in a beautiful genius , or of the warlike spirit in Mars , by means of an allegory, or attributes which wear a pleasant guise, and so only indirectly, through an interpretation on the part of reason, and not for the pure aesthetic judgement.
So much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is properly only the form of the presentation of a concept, and the means by which the latter is universally communicated. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swinging of the powers of the mind, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers.
A poem may be very pretty and elegant, but is devoid of spirit. A nar- rative has precision and method, but is devoid of spirit. A speech on some festive occasion may be good in substance and ornate withal, but may be devoid of spirit. Conversation frequently is not devoid of entertainment, but yet devoid of spirit.
But that whereby this principle animates the soul—the material which it employs for that purpose—is that which sets the mental powers into a swing that is purposive, i. Now my proposition is that this principle is nothing else than the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas.
The imagination as a productive faculty of cognition is a power- ful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature. By this means we come to feel our freedom from the law of association which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination , with the result that the material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be worked up by us into something else—namely, what surpasses nature.
Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas. But, on the other hand, there is this most important reason, that no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet essays the task of giving sensible form to the rational ideas of invisible beings, the king- dom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, and so forth.
Or, again, as to things of which examples occur in experience, e. This faculty, how- ever, regarded solely on its own account, is properly no more than a talent of the imagination. Those forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself, but which, as further representations of the imagina- tion, express the implications connected with it, and its kinship with other concepts, are called aesthetic attributes of an object, the concept of which, as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented.
Thus does the sun, his daily path completed, still shed a gentle light across the sky.
On the other hand, even an intellectual concept may serve, conversely, as attribute for a representation of the senses, and so enliven the latter with the idea of the supersensible; but only by the aesthetic aspect subjectively attaching to the consciousness of the supersensible being employed for the purpose. The mental powers whose union in a certain relation constitutes genius are imagination and understanding.
This latter talent is properly that which is termed spirit. Hence it presupposes understanding, but, in addition, a representation, inde- terminate though it be, of the material, i.
Consequently the imagination is represented by it in its freedom from all guidance of rules, but still as purposive for the presentation of the given con- cept. Genius, according to these presuppositions, is the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of a subject in the free employ- ment of his cognitive faculties. On this showing, the product of a genius in respect of so much in this product as is attributable to genius, and not to possible learning or academic instruction is an Analytic of the Sublime example, not to be imitated for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very spirit of the work , but to be fol- lowed by another genius—one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art, that for art itself a new rule is won—which is what shows a talent to be exemplary.
Yet, since the genius is one who is favoured by nature—something which must be regarded as but a rare phenomenon—for other clever minds his example gives rise to a school, that is to say a methodical instruction according to rules, collected, so far as the circumstances admit, from such products of genius and their peculi- arities. This courage has merit only in the case of a genius. A certain boldness of expression, and, in general, many a deviation from the common rule becomes him well, but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation.
On the contrary it remains all through intrinsically a blem- ish, which one is bound to try to remove, but for which the genius is, as it were, allowed to plead a privilege, on the ground that a scrupu- lous carefulness would spoil what is inimitable in the impetuous ardour of his spirit.
Mannerism is another kind of aping—an aping of peculiarity originality in general, for the sake of distancing oneself as far as possible from imitators, while the talent requisite to enable one to be at the same time exemplary is absent. The one is called a manner modus aestheticus , the other a method modus log- icus.
It is only, however, where the manner of carrying the idea into execution in a product of art is aimed at singu- larity instead of being made appropriate to the idea, that mannerism is properly ascribed to such a product.
For in lawless freedom imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but nonsense; the power of judgement, on the other hand, is the faculty that makes it consonant with understanding. Taste, like judgement in general, is the discipline or corrective of genius.
It is the combination of these three modes of expression which alone constitutes a complete communication of the speaker. For thought, intuition, and sensation are in this way conveyed to others simultaneously and in conjunction. It would, however, in that case appear too abstract, and less in line with popular conceptions. Rhetoric is the art of engaging a serious business of the understanding as if it were a free play of the imagination; poetry that of conducting a free play of the imagination as if it were a serious business of the understanding.
Thus the orator announces a serious business, and for the purpose of entertaining his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with ideas. It is only one of the various attempts that can and ought to be made.
For this reason what is studied and laboured must here be avoided. The orator, therefore, gives something which he does not promise, viz. On the other hand, there is something in which he fails to come up to his promise, and a thing, too, which is his avowed business, namely, the engagement of the under- standing to some end.
Hence the orator in reality performs less than he promises, the poet more. The second is the art of pre- senting concepts of things which are possible only through art, and the determining ground of whose form is not nature but an arbitrary end—and of presenting them both with a view to this purpose and yet, at the same time, with aesthetic purposiveness.
In architecture the chief point is a certain use of the artistic object to which, as the condition, the aesthetic ideas are limited. In sculpture the mere expression of aesthetic ideas is the main intention. Thus statues of men, gods, animals, and so forth, belong to sculpture; but temples, splendid buildings for public concourse, or even dwelling-houses, triumphal arches, columns, mausoleums, and the like, erected as monuments, belong to architecture, and in fact all household furni- ture the work of cabinet-makers, and so forth—things meant to be used may be added to the list, on the ground that adaptation of the product to a particular use is the essential element in a work of architecture.
On the other hand, a mere piece of sculpture, made simply to be looked at, and intended to please on its own account, is, as a corporeal presentation, a mere imitation of nature, though one in which regard is paid to aesthetic ideas, and in which, therefore, sensuous truth should not go the length of losing the appearance of being an art and a product of the power of choice. Painting, as the second kind of formative art, which presents the sen- suous semblance in artful combination with ideas, I would divide into that of the beautiful depiction of nature, and that of the beautiful arrangement of its products.